Needs, values, truth: essays in the philosophy of value

New York: Oxford University Press (1986)
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Abstract

Needs, Values, Truth brings together of some of the most important and influential writings by a leading contemporary philosopher, drawn from twenty-five years of his work in the broad area of the philosophy of value. The author ranges between problems of ethics, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of logic and language, looking at questions relating to meaning, truth and objectivity in judgements of value. For this third edition he has added a new essay on incommensurability, in addition to making minor revisions to the existing text. The volume will stand as a definitive summation of his work in this area

Other Versions

reprint Wiggins, David (1998) "Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value". Clarendon Press

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David Wiggins
Oxford University

Citations of this work

The emotional basis of moral judgments.Jesse Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.
On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):261-280.
Emotions and formal objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
The Fundamentality of Fit.Christopher Howard - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously.Michael Milona - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):897-915.

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