Reply to Wilson Mendonça’s “Supervenience arguments against robust moral realism”

Filosofia Unisinos 20 (3) (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.4013/fsu.2019.203.07

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Dreier on the supervenience argument against robust realism.Wilson Mendonça - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (3):167-171.
Metaphysics of Morals.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2014 - In Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-39.
Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?Jamie Dreier - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1391-1408.
Explaining the Quasi-Real.Jamie Dreier - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.
Explaining the Quasi-Real.Jamie Dreier - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 10. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 273-298.
Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited.Harold W. Noonan - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (1):151-165.
The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett, The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 170-84.
Review of Erik Wielenberg's Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. [REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):541-545.
The Supervenience Dilemma Explained Away.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - In Bartosz Brożek, Antonino Rotolo & Jerzy Stelmach, Supervenience and Normativity. Cham: Springer. pp. 105-122.
Disagreement.David Enoch - 2013 - In Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 185-216.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-12-20

Downloads
43 (#1,314,889)

6 months
17 (#690,063)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.

View all 22 references / Add more references