Perception: Essays After Frege

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

Charles Travis presents a series of essays on philosophy of perception, inspired by the insights of Gottlob Frege. He engages with a range of contemporary thinkers, and explores key issues including how perception can make the world bear on what we do or think, and what sorts of capacities we draw on in representing something as (being) something

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Review of: Charles Travis, Perception: Essays after Frege. [REVIEW]Keith Wilson - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (April).
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Charles Travis
King's College London

Citations of this work

Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis, Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.
Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.

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