Iterated Admissibility Through Forcing in Strategic Belief Models

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4):491-509 (2020)
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Abstract

Iterated admissibility embodies a minimal criterion of rationality in interactions. The epistemic characterization of this solution has been actively investigated in recent times: it has been shown that strategies surviving \ rounds of iterated admissibility may be identified as those that are obtained under a condition called rationality and m assumption of rationality in complete lexicographic type structures. On the other hand, it has been shown that its limit condition, with an infinity assumption of rationality ), might not be satisfied by any state in the epistemic structure, if the class of types is complete and the types are continuous. In this paper we analyze the problem in a different framework. We redefine the notion of type as well as the epistemic notion of assumption. These new definitions are sufficient for the characterization of iterated admissibility as the class of strategies that indeed satisfy \. One of the key methodological innovations in our approach involves defining a new notion of generic types and employing these in conjunction with Cohen’s technique of forcing.

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References found in this work

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Set Theory.T. Jech - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):243-245.
Cohen and set theory.Akihiro Kanamori - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):351-378.

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