Abstract

Frankfurt’s well-known analysis is useful for understanding bullshit assertions in spoken and written language. But the term “bullshit” is routinely applied to a wider range of phenomena. Paper work is bullshit. Textbook prices are bullshit. Airport security lines are bullshit. Even within the realm of language, Frankfurt’s analysis applies straightforwardly only to utterances that purport to aim at the truth. Yet, bullshit is possible not only in speech acts other than assertion, but also in conversational contexts where truth—even for assertions—is not the goal. I argue that Frankfurt’s essay contains the resources for a generalized theory of bullshit that encompasses the full range of phenomena, and of which the classic Frankfurtian analysis is a special instance. I contrast the account with other adaptations of Frankfurt’s approach. I conclude by exploring the important role that the concept of bullshit can play in debating and evaluating our practices more generally.