Theme: Bayesian Philosophy of Science

In Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann, Bayesian Philosophy of Science. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40 (2019)
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Abstract

This chapter sets the stage for what follows, introducing the reader to the philosophical principles and the mathematical formalism behind Bayesian inference and its scientific applications. We explain and motivate the representation of graded epistemic attitudes (“degrees of belief”) by means of specific mathematical structures: probabilities. Then we show how these attitudes are supposed to change upon learning new evidence (“Bayesian Conditionalization”), and how all this relates to theory evaluation, action and decision-making. After sketching the different varieties of Bayesian inference, we present Causal Bayesian Networks as an intuitive graphical tool for making Bayesian inference and we give an overview over the contents of the book.

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Author Profiles

Jan Sprenger
University of Turin