Intuitions and meaning divergence

Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):419-426 (2010)
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Abstract

Survey results are in the first instance utterances, which require interpretation. Moreover, when the results seem to involve disagreement in intuitive responses to a thought experiment, the results are most directly responsive to the scenario as envisaged by the particular subject, where the text of the example can give rise to relevantly different scenarios, depending on how the scenario is shaped by the subjects involved, under the guidance of the text. All of this opens up a defense of intuitions against results that ostensibly imply extensive intuitive disagreement based on cultural or socio-economic background. Critics of the armchair have replied to this defense in recent publications. This paper takes up some of those replies

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Ernest Sosa
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Replies.Stephen Stich - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop, Stich and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 190–252.

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