The Case of the Ontology of Consciousness: The Identity Inversion.

Abstract

This paper proposes a solution to the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" through a radical revision of the Identity Theory. The author substantiates an inversion of physicalist identity: instead of reducing thought to neurons, the state of the neural network is recognized as the material instantiation of objective ideal structures. Following E. Ilyenkov, the "Ideal" is understood as an objective form of human activity embodied in culture. The concept of the "ontological deficit of resources" is introduced as a functional justification for the emergence of qualia: subjective experience is viewed as an evolutionarily selected interface for the instantaneous selection of probabilities under conditions of limited time and energy. The work demonstrates that consciousness does not violate the causal closure of the world; rather, it serves as a mechanism for the realization of the ideal laws of culture within a physical substrate.

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2026-02-18

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References found in this work

Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (2):141-56.
The Analysis of Matter.Bertrand Russell - 1927 - London: Kegan Paul.
Psychological predicates.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill, Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 37--48.
Is consciousness a brain process.Ullin T. Place - 1956 - British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.

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