Abstract

The author argues with such philosophers as F. Böckle, J. Gründel, F. Furger and F. Bednarski about their views concerning the so-called dynamic character of natural law. He demonstrates that natural law as formulated by these authors would have to be in its essence variable. When inferring this the authors must realize that they deprive the terms nature and natural law of their essential sense. Nature is understood as an aggregate of features permitting to identify the being notwithstanding its variability. Dynamics of natural law may signify that it is an essentially invariable appeal to the free subject, that is man. The subject is at the same time potential. As the ad actum being he realizes himself since accepting the appeal of natural law he liberates in himself and accomplishes what used to be merely his potentiality. Thus due to free acceptance of unvariable natural law man is abie to give the best direction to his dynamics. It is only in this sense that we can discuss the dynamic character of natural law.