Black ravens and a white shoe

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3):339-342 (1991)
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Abstract

This paper provides an explanation of why sightings of black ravens increase the degree of warranted belief in the proposition that all ravens are black, while observations of white shoes do not. The explanation, which allows a Bayesian interpretation, rests on an assumption of the redundancy (i.e., lawfulness) of nature.

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10.1093/bjps/42.3.339

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