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A puzzle for epistemic WAMs
Synthese 196 (11):4679-4689 (2019)
Abstract
In recent literature, a very popular position about the normativity of assertion claims that standards for epistemically proper assertion vary with practical context, while standards for knowledge do not. This paper shows this claim is strongly incompatible with the received value-theoretic view regarding the relationship between the axiological and the deontic: one of the two has to go.Author's Profile
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Epistemic WAMs.Mona Simion - 2021 - In Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 18-31.
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Citations of this work
The epistemic normativity of conjecture.Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3447-3471.
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