Abstract

Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, philosophers have studied functional structure of human mind. So called 'faculty psychology' is the study of innate structure of human cognition. However, it is Gall's theory of faculties that started the study of domain specific and autonomous units of human mind. This dissertation discusses modularity of mind, i.e., the idea that mind consists of such domain specific and autonomous units, i.e., cognitive modules. ;In the first of the dissertation, I discuss faculty psychology as a historical precursor of modularity and recent theories of modularity that are developed to capture different aspects of a cognitive system. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I discuss Fodorian modularity, a comprehensive and well developed theory of modularity. Two problems of Fodorian modularity are discussed. First, Fodorian modularity is problematic because it has a problematic element, i.e., neural specificity. Fodor explains informational encapsulation of a cognitive system in terms of specific neural structure of the system. However, I argue that neural specificity is not fully demonstrated in psychology. Second, Fodorian modularity is an internally specified property of a cognitive system. Modularity, however, can be understood as an external property, a property that is specified by a cognitive system's relation to other objects and properties in the world.