What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird’s Epistemic View

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):241-255 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper challenges Bird’s view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge, by arguing that unjustified scientific beliefs (and/or changes in belief) may nevertheless be progressive. It also argues that false beliefs may promote progress.

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Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University

Citations of this work

Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56 (C):72-83.
A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress.Yafeng Shan - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):739-758.
Scientific progress and modern cosmology.Patrick Dürr & Finnur Dellsén - 2025 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 15 (4):72.
Scientific progress: Four accounts.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12525.

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The logic of scientific discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Hutchinson Publishing Group.
Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Criticism and the growth of knowledge.Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) - 1970 - Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.

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