Paraconsistency Everywhere

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):147-156 (2002)
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Abstract

“Paraconsistent” means “beyond the consistent” [3, 15]. Paraconsistent logics tolerate inconsistencies in a way that traditional logics do not. In a paraconsistent logic, the inference of explosion A, ∼AB is rejected. This may be for any of a number of reasons [16]. For proponents of relevance [1, 2] the argument has gone awry when we infer an irrelevant B from the inconsistent premises. Those who argue that inconsistent theories may have some logical content but do not commit us to everything, have reason to think that these theories are closed under a relation of paraconsistent logical consequence [12, 18]. Another reason to adopt a paraconsistent logic is more extreme. You may take the world to be inconsistent [14], and a true theory incorporating this inconsistency must be governed by a paraconsistent logic.

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Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

References found in this work

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In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - Hingham, MA, USA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing.
Semantic analysis of orthologic.R. I. Goldblatt - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1/2):19 - 35.

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