Political Disagreement, Moral Misinformation, and Affective Polarization

In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter addresses the relationship between misinformation and disagreement. We begin by arguing that one traditional bogeyman in this domain, ideological polarization, does not account for the many problems that have been documented. Instead, affective polarization seems to be the root cause of most of these problems. We then discuss the relationships between moral outrage, misinformation, and affective polarization. We next turn to the political implications of affective polarization and conclude by discussing some potential solutions to the problems that arise in this area.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Affective Polarization and Testimonial and Discursive Injustice.Manuel Almagro-Holgado & Alba Moreno-Zurita - 2022 - In David Bordonaba Plou, Víctor Fernández Castro & José Ramón Torices, The Political Turn in Analytic Philosophy: Reflections on Social Injustice and Oppression. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 257-278.
Political Epistemology.Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.) - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fake News!Cailin O’Connor & James Owen Weatherall - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (6):e13005.
Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization.Jeroen de Ridder - 2021 - In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon, Political Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 226-243.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-08-15

Downloads
1,121 (#46,169)

6 months
224 (#45,437)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Mark Alfano
Macquarie University
Ritsaart Reimann
University of Graz

Citations of this work

Add more citations