Are physical properties dispositions?

Philosophy of Science 62 (1):141-149 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Averill (1990) argues that not every property is a disposition. I claim here that his reasoning is faulty, suffering at one point from a logical error and at other points from an inadequate account of counterfactuals.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Are physical properties dispositions?Edward Wilson Averill - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):118-132.
Dispositions and the Argument from Science.Neil E. Williams - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71 - 90.
Russellian Physicalism and the Causal Relevance of Consciousness.Staale Gundersen - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:57-61.
XIII—Knowing How to Reason Logically.Corine Besson - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):327-353.
Indirect Directness.Jennifer McKitrick - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
Superficial Dispositionalism.Lauren Ashwell - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):635-653.
Dispositional and Categorical Properties.John Heil - 2003 - In From an ontological point of view. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-96.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
418 (#118,667)

6 months
59 (#153,066)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
In defense of dispositions.D. H. Mellor - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (2):157-181.
Are physical properties dispositions?Edward Wilson Averill - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):118-132.

Add more references