How does the Humean sense of duty motivate?

Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (3):383-407 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

On Hume's account, when we lack virtues that would typically prompt moral action, we can instead be motivated by the "sense of duty." Surprisingly, Hume seems to maintain that, in such cases, we are motivated by a desire to avoid the unpleasantness of "self-hatred" evoked in us when we realize we lack certain traits others possess. This account has led commentators to argue that Hume is not a moral internalist, since motivation by duty is motivation by a self-interested desire. This paper concludes that Hume is indeed a moral internalist and that the motive of duty can be understood as a form of motivation by moral disapprobation in a way supported by Hume's general motivational psychology

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
235 (#173,891)

6 months
52 (#165,018)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Sympathy and Hume's Spectator‐Centered, Theory of Virtue.Kate Abramson - 2008 - In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, A Companion to Hume. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 240–256.
Critical Notice.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):549-573.
Hume on Moral Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Sympathy.Charlotte R. Brown - 2008 - In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, A Companion to Hume. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 217–239.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references