Defeasible Reasoning

Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518 (1987)
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Abstract

There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.

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John Pollock
University of Edinburgh

References found in this work

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Knowledge and Justification.John L. Pollock - 1974 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Edited by John Pollock.

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