Abstract

It is a common view that unlike what we do, what we believe is not up to us. Beliefs are thus understood to be passive states. It is also sometimes thought that even if our beliefs were up to us, this would entail that they were irrational because were we able to believe whatever we want to believe, then such belief states would not be truth-directed. But if we have no fairly direct control over what we believe, then beliefs are not proper objects of epistemic, or moral, responsibility. In this dissertation I examine two paradigms of the voluntariness of belief. I argue that there are several ways in which beliefs can be voluntary and that voluntary beliefs are not necessarily irrational. I begin by considering the Cartesian theory of judgment, and attempt to defend it against a number of objections. According to Descartes, judgment is an act of will. I argue that, on Descartes' picture, acts of will are ideally and naturally rational. Thus, on the Cartesian paradigm, the voluntariness of a belief should not entail that it is irrational. In contrast, on the paradigm presented by Bernard Williams, the voluntariness of a belief is understood in terms of its being acquired irrespective of its truth. According to Williams, the possibility of acquiring beliefs at will would be in conflict with the fact that beliefs aim at truth; and thus beliefs cannot be voluntary. I show that there are a number of problems with Williams' argument, but concur with him that beliefs' aiming at truth would be contravened by acquiring beliefs independently of truth considerations. In attempting to understand this fact I consider several accounts of aiming at truth. I argue that Williams' account neglects the active and rational aspects of mind. The Cartesian account's strength lies in emphasizing these features. While it is implausible to hold that all of our beliefs are acquired by assent, I argue there is a broader range of activity and rationality exercised in belief-acquisition than is commonly acknowledged