Abstract

The paper compares the thought of Democritus and that of Colotes. It is argued that the two thinkers diverge at least in three noteworthy respects: 1) they disagree about the nature of knowledge, for Democritus identifies it with a process which goes from raw (and untrustworthy) sensation to intellectual understanding, whereas Colotes affirms the truth of every sensation and its fundamental role in the use of reason; 2) they have contrary opinions on the practice of “pleasing”, since the former totally rejects this as a damaging form of obsequiousness, while the latter allows a form of pleasing which is good, i.e. which can lead to pleasure and security; 3) they describe death differently, for Democritus affirms that it consists in the loss of most of the soul atoms (which also allows, to a certain degree, the phenomenon of the “return to life”), whereas Colotes may have followed Epicurus in depicting death as the complete loss of soul particles. Such an investigation suggests, on both historical and philosophical grounds, that Democritus and Colotes did not embrace the same kind of atomism, but two atomisms, which start from different premises and pursue different goals.