Moderate Mindreading Priority

In Antonino Pennisi & Alessandra Falzone, The Extended Theory of Cognitive Creativity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Performativity. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 103-113 (2020)
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Abstract

According to the common sense view, self-consciousness is the climax of human cognition. This provides the ordinary feeling of being special thanks to the faculty of self-consciousness. But, we can doubt how much nature takes care of our satisfactory feeling of being self-conscious. What if self-consciousness has any top role in human cognition? In particular, is self-consciousness really prior to mindreading?, or the contrary? Call the first thesis “self-consciousness priority account” and the other “mindreading priority account”. While MRPA is also the view that mindreading evolved prior to self-consciousness, SCPA is the claim that self-consciousness evolved prior to mindreading.

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Pietro Perconti
Università degli Studi di Messina

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Rethinking Subjectivity.Pietro Perconti - 2026 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 63 (1):22-35.

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