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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism
Noûs 40 (2):205-240 (2006)
Abstract
Phenomenal intentionality is a singular form of intentionality. Science shows it is internally-determined. So standard externalist models for reducing intentionality don't apply to it.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach.Bradford Saad - 2025 - Analytic Philosophy 66 (4):594-621.
Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
In defense of the armchair: Against empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception.Peter Fisher Epstein - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):784-814.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
B.Gottfried Gabriel, Matthias Gatzemeier, Carl F. Gethmann, Peter Janich, Friedrich Kambartel, Kuno Lorenz, Klaus Mainzer, Peter Schroeder-Heister, Christian Thiel, Reiner Wimmer & Martin Carrier - 2024 - In Gottfried Gabriel, Matthias Gatzemeier, Carl F. Gethmann, Peter Janich, Friedrich Kambartel, Kuno Lorenz, Klaus Mainzer, Peter Schroeder-Heister, Christian Thiel, Reiner Wimmer & Martin Carrier, Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie: Band 1: A–B. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 336-560.
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