Scientific Platonism

In Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael Potter, Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 123-149 (2007)
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Abstract

Does natural science give us reason to believe that mathematical statements are true? And does natural science give us reason to believe in some particular metaphysics of mathematics? These two questions should be firmly distinguished. My argument in this chapter is that a negative answer to the second question is compatible with an affirmative answer to the first. Loosely put, even if science settles the truth of mathematics, it does not settle its metaphysics.

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A. C. Paseau
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Trumping Naturalism Revisited.Alexander Paseau - 2024 - In Sophia Arbeiter & Juliette Kennedy, The Philosophy of Penelope Maddy. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 267-290.
Indispensabilism's Unfinished Business.A. C. Paseau - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Alexander Paseau - 2012 - In Ed Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):63-97.

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