Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artifacts: What Existing Artifacts Fail to Achieve , and Why They, Nevertheless, Can Make Moral Claims upon Us

International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):141-161 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper follows directly from an earlier paper where we discussed the requirements for an artifact to be a moral agent and concluded that the artifactual question is ultimately a red herring. As...

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Blay Whitby
University of Sussex

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by John McDowell.
Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind.Evan Thompson - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 2000 - New York: University Of Chicago Press.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.

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