Faith and Doubt at the Cry of Dereliction: a Defense of Doxasticism

Sophia 61 (2):253-265 (2022)
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Abstract

Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith that p entails belief that p. This view has recently come under fire within analytic philosophy of religion. One common objection is that faith is compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. One version of this objection, recently employed by Beth Rath, is to use a particular story, in this case Jesus Christ’s cry of dereliction, to argue that someone had propositional faith while ceasing to believe. Thus, doxasticism is false. Rath’s approach of analyzing a case from scripture has the advantage of allowing her to provide evidence for the claim that a subject had propositional faith but lost belief. However, I argue that Rath faces a dilemma: on the interpretation of the passage necessary for her argument, either Christ did lose his propositional faith that God was with him, or else he did not lose his belief that God was with him. Either way, she must reject a key premise in her argument.

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Joshua Mugg
Park University

Citations of this work

Reconsidering faith and doubt (as suspension of judgment).John Paul Del Rosario - 2026 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 99 (1):4.

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References found in this work

Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
Can it be Rational to have Faith?Lara Buchak - 2012 - In Jake Chandler & Victoria S. Harrison, Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 225.

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