A paraconsistent theory of belief revision

Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246 (2002)
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Abstract

This paper presents a theory of belief revision that allows people to come tobelieve in contradictions. The AGM theory of belief revision takes revision,in part, to be consistency maintenance. The present theory replacesconsistency with a weaker property called coherence. In addition to herbelief set, we take a set of statements that she rejects. These two sets arecoherent if they do not overlap. On this theory, belief revision maintains coherence.

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2009-01-28

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Edwin Mares
Victoria University of Wellington

Citations of this work

Inference to the Best Contradiction?Sam Baron - 2025 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 76 (3):759-781.
Paraconsistent dynamics.Patrick Girard & Koji Tanaka - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):1-14.

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References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Natural History of Negation.Laurence R. Horn - 1989 - University of Chicago Press.
A Natural History of Negation.Laurence R. Horn - 1989 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 24 (2):164-168.
Handbook of Philosophical Logic.D. M. Gabbay & F. Guenthner - 2007 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13 (2):248-250.

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