F. H. Bradley and the philosophy of science

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1):65 – 78 (1991)
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Abstract

Abstract It is sometimes thought that Absolute Idealism was undermined by its inability to deal with science. Through a critical discussion of F. H. Bradley's philosophy of science, this idea is challenged. His views on science are divided into a positive and a negative part, and it is argued that, although he found the scientific world view to be essentially false, he was nonetheless able to develop a sympathetic and intelligent philosophy of science. This was basically pragmatic and instrumental in tone, and gave to science a large measure of autonomy from philosophy. His doctrine is connected with certain contemporary ideas in the philosophy of science

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References found in this work

The ontological status of theoretical entities.Grover Maxwell - 1962 - In Herbert Feigl & Grover Maxwell, Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis, MN, USA: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 181-192.
The Concept of Nature: Tarner Lectures.Alfred North Whitehead - 1920 - Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.
Essays on Truth and Reality.Francis Herbert Bradley - 1914 - Oxford, England: Cambridge University Press.

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