Determinacy of Reference, Schematic Theories, and Internal Categoricity

Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia:31-65 (2018)
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Abstract

The article surveys the problem of the determinacy of reference in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics focusing on Peano arithmetic. I present the philosophical arguments behind the shift from the problem of the referential determinacy of singular mathematical terms to that of nonalgebraic/univocal theories. I examine Shaughan Lavine’s particular solution to this problem based on schematic theories and an internalized version of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano arithmetic. I will argue that Lavine’s detailed and sophisticated solution is unwarranted. However, some of the arguments that I present are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all versions of internal categoricity conceived as a philosophical remedy for the problem of referential determinacy of arithmetical theories.

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References found in this work

What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Philosophy and Model Theory.Tim Button & Sean Walsh - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Edited by Sean Walsh & Wilfrid Hodges.
Putnam’s paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
Models and reality.Hilary Putnam - 1980 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.

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