Autonomy, Value and the First Person

In Lubomira Radoilska, Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.

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Photo of Hallvard Lillehammer
Hallvard Lillehammer
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Autonomy, Consent, and the “Nonideal” Case.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (3):297-311.
Three challenges from delusion for theories of autonomy.K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska, Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 44-74.
Autonomy and Ulysses Arrangements.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska, Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 252-280.
Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy.Michelle Maiese - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):19-41.

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References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The second-person standpoint.Stephen Darwall - 2006 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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