Abstract

This essay explores John Dupré’s philosophical pluralism and processualism in and of the biological sciences and his pioneering theme of the disunity of science and nature. I trace some of the parallels in our thinking on these topics. A key goal is to consider consequences of his pluralism about biological classification in reflecting on his metaphysical stance toward process ontology and epistemology as the most suitable kind of philosophy for biology. I diagnose Dupré’s philosophical strategy as one of taking models and modelers at face value for what they assume (metaphysically) and say (epistemically) about empirical “nature.” I argue this is not always the best strategy for understanding the content of scientific practices, even if it is a good way of identifying value commitments of scientists and their scientific practices. I contrast “multi-perspectivism” with Dupré’s philosophically pluralist disunity stance in the hope of honoring John’s deep and profound contributions to philosophy of biology, philosophy of science, and philosophia in its wide sense as love of wisdom.