The distinction between primary and secondary qualities in ancient Greek philosophy

In Lawrence Nolan, Primary and secondary qualities: the historical and ongoing debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 15 (2011)
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Abstract

This chapter argues that the primary–secondary quality distinction can be found in ancient Greek philosophers in the form of two distinctions, one between the intrinsic qualities of basic matter and the derivative qualities of composites, and another between appearance and reality. The first ancient Greek thinkers to consider the place of sensible qualities such as colors and smells in the natural world were Plato and Democritus. Both draw a kind of distinction between the intrinsic qualities of basic matter and the non-intrinsic qualities of composites and aggregates. Aristotle offers his own version of this kind of distinction, emphasizing that sensible qualities have causal efficacy in their powers to affect perceivers in certain ways. Epicurus went even further in arguing that sensible qualities are relational powers, and like relational powers are real properties of things, not to be dismissed as merely subjective appearances.

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