The Notion of Civil Disobedience According To Locke

Diogenes 9 (35):109-135 (1961)
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Abstract

The notion of resistance to the state has come to be bandied about a great deal, and a great many political movements place themselves under its sign. This intrusion of violence into the realm of the law seems to be spreading since the advocates of insurrection, who accuse the state of betraying its mission, are not those who consider revolt to be the necessary first step towards any kind of affranchisement. Where the partisans of revolution believe that violence is, in Marx's words, “the midwife of every old society that carries a new one within it” and that it is “the instrument by which the social movement sweeps it away and breaks to pieces the political forms that are fixed and dead,” the partisans of the right to resist the state do not share these hopes for political and social upheavals. Marxist theory, which praises revolutionary insurrection, stands opposed to a kind of philosophy that admits of armed opposition to the state, but can nevertheless be called liberal in two respects: formally, from its present perspective, where it appears opposed to Marxist thought, and also historically, in the evolution of political ideas, where it is opposed to absolutist conceptions of the state. For, as R. Derathé remarked, the question of the right to resist “cast light on the chasm that separated the theologians from the legal experts.” The doctrines of divine right left no room for envisaging a limitation on the duty of obedience, without turning such a limitation into the equivalent of a revolt against God. Bossuet, in his Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Ecriture sainte, asserts that “God has made the kings and the princes his lieutenants on earth so as to render their authority sacred and inviolable.” The result is unconditional obedience to the kings and to all those who hold a parcel of authority: “Declared impiety and even persecution do not exempt the subjects from the obedience they owe to their princes.” The only possible attitude in the face of “the violence of the princes” is to submit “respectful remonstrances, without mutiny and without a murmur, and with prayers for their conversion.” It is also necessary to ban “remonstrances full of bitterness and grumbling” since these “are the beginnings of sedition, which must not be tolerated.”

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