Relational environmental ethics and the challenge of moral cultural relativism

Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 26:esep00232 (2026)
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Abstract

This paper critically examines the relationship between relational environmental ethics and relativism. Relational environmental ethics, which foreground the moral significance of humans’ interdependence and kinship with components of nature, have gained influence as alternatives to individualistic and dualistic Western frameworks. However, their contextual and culturally sensitive orientation makes such theories susceptible to moral cultural relativism, which could undermine their ability to provide cross-cultural criticism of environmentally harmful norms and to protect individuals from coercive communal expectations. This paper seeks to address this overlooked issue. I propose common criteria for evaluating what is consistent with people’s relational ethical commitments across cultures, avoiding the legitimisation of destructive environmental practices. I also propose a ‘self-care clause’ to allow individuals to not comply with oppressive or harmful norms in their communities. These proposals aim to enhance the critical and emancipatory capacities of relational environmental ethics, ensuring their relevance and integrity in a pluralistic, global context.

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Tianxiang Lan
National University of Singapore

References found in this work

Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.
The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism.Karen J. Warren - 1990 - Environmental Ethics 12 (2):125-146.
The Ethics of Respect for Nature.Paul W. Taylor - 1981 - Environmental Ethics 3 (3):197-218.
Role obligations.Michael O. Hardimon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (7):333-363.

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