Abstract

From the preceding survey of philosophy, we move to consider the philosophical situation we find ourselves in. We see in more detail how Cartesian dualism and his “epoché” valorised the simplification and abstraction of reductionism, for both better and worse. For a time this has allowed us to concentrate upon reaping the fruits of mathematical science at the expense of a full engagement with our rich, complex human situation. Despite the benefits of this reductionism it has left us with the problem today not of developing philosophy but of recovering it. To this end, the reality of structure needed to be reintroduced through the structuralism of Saussure, the phenomenon through the phenomenology of Husserl, and the sign through the semiotics of Peirce. We see in all cases excellent developments of thought towards complexity and meaning. This recovered thought is, however, still fractured and partial. We then consider how this partiality informs the philosophy that frames modern biology. The main problem we face is the conflation of the limited theoretical assumptions used for the practise of scientific research with full philosophical insight and truth.