Abstract

Since the time of antiquity, philosophers and scientists have debated the independent nature of space and, more recently, of spacetime. Substantivalists, on the one hand, argue that spacetime exists independently of material objects and provides an objective framework for spatiotemporal relations. Relationists, on the other hand, deny the independent existence of spacetime and hold that spacetime is simply a system of spatiotemporal relations between objects. ;John Earman and John Norton present their criticism of substantivalism: the "hole argument." General relativity yields "hole diffeomorphic" spacetime models--models that differ within a region, or "hole," of spacetime. Earman and Norton argue that a substantivalist interpretation of general relativity implies that these hole diffeomorphic models make physically different predictions, resulting in a radically indeterministic general relativity. Therefore, substantivalism must be incorrect. ;I argue that the hole argument is faulty. In order to apply general relativity to physical situations, one must specify the background structures with respect to which the spatiotemporal features can be described. This procedure selects one of the many hole diffeomorphic models, and thus resolves the problem of multiple models making conflicting predictions. I show that this argument holds for a simple postulational system, and then show it holds for general relativity. ;In addition to arguing for my own resolution of the hole argument, I present the background of the hole argument as well as an evaluation of the current debate. Chapters 1 and 2 describe the historical and technical background of the hole argument. Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of hole argument as presented by Earman and Norton. Chapter 4 presents responses to the hole argument that attempt to rescue substantivalism and that criticize the hole argument itself. Finally, Chapter 5 presents my response to the hole argument.