Frege and the Fundamental Abstraction

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):74-82 (2024)
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Abstract

According to Charles Travis, Frege’s principle “always to sharply separate the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective” involves a move called “the fundamental abstraction.” I try to explain what this abstraction is and why it is interesting. I then raise a problem for it, and describe what I think is a better way to understand Frege’s principle.

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Jim Hutchinson
Nazarbayev University

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