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Foundationalism and arbitrariness
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24 (2005)
Abstract
Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
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Basic reasons and first philosophy: A coherentist view of reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
Constituting sources is a matter of correlational claims.Kiran Pala - 2023 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 10 (898).
References found in this work
Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
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