The Paradox of Knowability and Domain Variation

Philosophia (forthcoming)
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Abstract

An influential approach to Fitch’s Paradox of knowability is the Domain Variation Analysis. This article presents a novel argument against this approach. Fitch’s Paradox comes in different varieties. There is the common version of the paradox involving the principle that every truth is knowable, and there is also a slightly different version of the paradox involving the principle that every truth is knowable by us. There are good reasons to suppose that if the Domain Variation Analysis qualifies as a successful solution to Fitch’s Paradox, it should be able to solve both versions of the paradox. However, it will be argued in this paper that, though the Domain Variation Analysis solves the common version of the paradox, it fails to solve this slightly different version of the paradox. Thus, the credibility of the Domain Variation Analysis would be very significantly undermined.

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Chaoan He
East China Normal University

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References found in this work

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.
New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Joe Salerno (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Verificationism and non-distributive knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):78 – 86.
Knowability Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.

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