Gauging What's Real: The Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Gauge Theories

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2009)
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Abstract

This is a prize-winning study of an area of physics not previously explored by philosophy: gauge theory. Gauge theories have provided our most successful representations of the fundamental forces of nature. But how do such representations work? Healey defends an original answer to this question.

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Richard Andrew Healey
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

Scientific Realism Made Effective.Porter Williams - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):209-237.
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Respecting boundaries: theoretical equivalence and structure beyond dynamics.William J. Wolf & James Read - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (4):1-28.
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