The moral supervenience thesis is not a conceptual truth

Analysis 73 (1):62-68 (2013)
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Abstract

Virtually everyone takes the moral supervenience thesis to be a basic conceptual truth about morality. As a result, if a metaethical theory has difficulties respecting or adequately explaining the supervenience relationship it is deemed to be in big trouble. However, the moral supervenience thesis is a not a conceptual truth (though it may be true) and as such it is not a problem if a metaethical theory cannot respect or explain it.

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10.1093/analys/ans140

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Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University

Citations of this work

Standing up for supervenience.Bart Streumer - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):138-154.
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Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):821-851.
Supervenience, Dependence, Disjunction.Lloyd Humberstone - 2019 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 28 (1):3-135.

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References found in this work

The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research.Robert K. Shope - 1983 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
On the Gettier Problem problem.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington, Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--168.

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