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Non-Propositional Intentionality
Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.)
(2018)
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Know-how and non-propositional intentionality.Katalin Farkas - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-113.
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Citations of this work
Conscious Thought Under Sensory Deprivation: Avicenna’s Flying Man and ‘I’.Mahrad Almotahari - 2025 - The Monist 108 (3):318-336.
The problem of evaluability for objectual content.Valentina Martinis - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
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