Abstract

In this paper, I argue for a revised account of two fundamental conceptual structures in late antique Platonism: the scale of virtues (βαθμοί τῶν ἀρετῶν) and the scale of inspired madness (βαθμοί τῶν μανίων). Both structures are invoked by Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonists between the 5th-6th centuries CE, serving to organize discussions of ethics and epistemology, metaphysics, hagiography, and reading curricula. I focus on apparently contradictory evidence for the highest tiers of the scale of virtues, as well as its relationship to the inspirations or maniai, drawing on Hermias (c.410-450 CE), Damascius (c.462-after 538 CE), and Olympiodorus (c.500-after 565 CE). While many interpreters have reasonably found these latter testimonies irreconcilable, I argue that all three witnesses share a consistent view with one another and with Proclus (412-485 CE). I conclude that the stages of virtue and inspiration may be pictured as parallel scales, which transform the human soul (psychē) in comparable ways, although inspiration reaches further. The Porphyrian sage might be compared to a painter, alternating attention between her intelligible model (paradeigma) and the ‘canvas’ of her habits, in order to adapt the latter to the former. The post-Iamblichean sage strives to act in the very moment that she receives intelligible illumination, like a dancer moving to the music of inspiration.