Abstract

In this chapter, I describe and develop the notion of epistemic vulnerability that has gained momentum in other areas of philosophy. The aim is to provide a new basis to assess the epistemological status of our beliefs, including scientific beliefs. Our epistemic vulnerability places us in a neutral position between epistemic fallibilism and epistemic success. It does not deny that we are epistemically fallible beings, but stresses, more emphatically than plain fallibilism does, the possibility of epistemic success—even truth. I propose two models to clarify this notion. The first example, comprising a girl attempting to climb to the top of a tree, highlights the general traits of our vulnerability, both at the level of the actions of the vulnerable subject who tries to achieve a goal and at the meta-level of those who judge the prospects of her future successes and failures. The second example is based on the COVID-19 lateral flow tests and their reliability. These tests are highly reliable because they succeed most of the time in ‘telling’ us if a person has or does not have a virus. However, they also sometimes fail in their detection function. I apply traits from both models to our epistemic and meta-epistemic vulnerability and stress why these models need additions and improvements to account for epistemic vulnerability in science.