Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts

In Robert W. Lurz, The Philosophy of Animal Minds. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 184--200 (2009)
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Abstract

I argue that recent developments in animal cognition support the conclusion that HOT theory is consistent with animal consciousness. There seems to be growing evidence that many animals are indeed capable of having I-thoughts, including episodic memory, as well as have the ability to understand the mental states of others.

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Rocco J. Gennaro
University of Southern Indiana

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