Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception hypothesis, and the socially extended mind

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38:e75 (2015)
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Abstract

Pessoa'sThe Cognitive-Emotional Brain(2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental processes is not reducible to specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.

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Tom Froese
Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University

Citations of this work

Consideraciones sobre la percepción desde la perspectiva enactiva.Ana Lorena Dominguez Rojas - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (1):29-49.
Freedom: An enactive possibility.Adam Rostowski - 2022 - Human Affairs 32 (4):427-438.
The Reductive Roots of Mechanistic Explanations.Roque Molina Marchese - 2026 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 33 (1):33-74.

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