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Extended mental features
In Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine & Mog Stapleton, Andy Clark and his Critics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 44-55 (2019)
Abstract
The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This paper revisits the question of extending consciousness.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Phenomenal transparency, cognitive extension, and predictive processing.Marco Facchin - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (2):305-327.
Predictive Processing and Extended Consciousness: Why the Machinery of Consciousness Is (Probably) Still in the Head and the DEUTS Argument Won’t Let It Leak Outside.Marco Facchin & Niccolò Negro - 2023 - In Mark-Oliver Casper & Giuseppe Flavio Artese, Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 181-208.
Is Extended Consciousness Possible?Xiuyuan An & Qiu Wang - 2022 - 哲学分析(Philosophical Analysis) 13 (2):157-172+199.
References found in this work
Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension.Andy Clark - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Six Views of Embodied Cognition.Margaret Wilson - 2002 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (4):625--636.
Deictic codes for the embodiment of cognition.Dana H. Ballard, Mary M. Hayhoe, Polly K. Pook & Rajesh P. N. Rao - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):723-742.
Spreading the joy? Why the machinery of consciousness is (probably) still in the head.Andy Clark - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):963-993.
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