Value-Based Theories of Reasons and Matters of Taste: Aquinas on the Limitations of Reason Alone

Divus Thomas 121 (3):371-377 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper, I explore one line of argument for the Humean Theory of Reasons, the view that all normative reasons are based on desires. Then, I suggest a way to block that argument inspired by Aquinas’s discussions on choice, will, and indeterminacy of reason alone.

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Seyyed Mohsen Eslami
Tarbiat Modares University

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