Abstract

The insight that philosophical positions ought to be understood as stances rather than doctrines is one of the cornerstones of Bas van Fraassen’s critique of metaphysics. It has been argued, however, that not all kinds of metaphysics are equally vulnerable to this critique. In particular, James Ladyman and Don Ross have integrated van Fraassen’s emphasis on stances into the defence of what they call scientific metaphysics. This raises the question to what extent such a metaphysics can still claim (as scientific metaphysicians routinely do) to be concerned with objective truth, which is usually understood as pertaining to doctrines, not to stances. It also transforms the way in which such a metaphysics might be defended against alternative philosophical projects, based on alternative stances. I will analyze this transformation in the context of Anjan Chakravartty’s recent claim that no rational stance can be demonstrated to be superior to any other.