Abstract

In this chapter I develop a novel understanding of moral protest based on the observation that it can come apart from blame. I argue that while blame appraises wrongdoers, protest is a response to wrongdoing. I analyse protest into objections and demands for redress and offer an account of objections as stance-takings: in objecting, a speaker expresses and commits to the stance that the conduct objected to was objectionable. This account allows for attitudes related to moral protest that can remain unexpressed: (1) the internalized stance that the conduct protested is objectionable and (2) emotions of moral disapproval directed at pieces of conduct. The chapter offers a discussion of what an objecting stance consists in as well as a characterisation of the emotion of moral disapproval of pieces of conduct. This discussion of act-directed moral responses points us to non-conflicting ways of registering and standing up to inacceptable conduct.