Varieties of Risk

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):432-455 (2020)
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Abstract

The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic conception of risk on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how probable it is, and in favour of a modal conception on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how modally close it is. In this article, we use Pritchard’s discussion as a springboard for a more wide-ranging discussion of the notion of risk. We introduce three different conceptions of risk: the standard probabilistic conception, Pritchard’s modal conception, and a normalcy conception that is new (though it has some precursors in the psychological literature on risk perception). Ultimately, we argue that the modal conception is ill-suited to the roles that a notion of risk is required to play and explore the prospects for a form of pluralism about risk, embracing both the probabilistic and the normalcy conceptions.

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Author Profiles

Philip A. Ebert
University of Salzburg
Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh

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Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.

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